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Globalization brings opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging markets to innovate
and improve their competitive position. Using data on firms in 27 emerging market economies, we
estimate the effects of foreign competition, vertical linkages with foreign firms, and international trade
on several types of innovation by domestic firms. Using instrumental variables and a battery of checks,
we provide robust evidence of a positive relationship between foreign competition and innovation
and show that the supply chain of multinational enterprises and international trade are also important
channels. There is no evidence for an inverted U relationship between innovation and foreign competition.
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1.  Introduction 
With the opening of borders to trade and foreign investment, globalization brings 
opportunities and pressures for domestic firms in emerging market economies to innovate 
and improve their competitive position. Many of these pressures and opportunities 
operate through increased competition from and linkages with foreign firms.  In this 
paper, we examine the determinants of innovation by domestic firms in emerging market 
economies. Our focus is on the effect of competition and transfer of capabilities 
stemming from globalization, which may be brought about through various channels, 
including the entry of foreign firms (foreign direct investment – FDI), trade, and 
increased competitive responses by domestic firms.  Specifically, we use micro data on 
over 11,500 firms in 27 transition economies to test predictions that are derived from 
recent theoretical models by Sutton (2007a), Aghion et al. (2005a, 2005b and 2006) and 
others.  
 
1.1  Theoretical Literature and Predictions 
Whereas considerable attention has been paid to the effects of globalization on 
productivity of firms in emerging market economies, the literature has only recently 
begun to be concerned with the effects of globalization on innovation by the local firms.
1 
Yet, innovation is the presumed conduit through which globalization affects productivity.  
There are two broad mechanisms that can affect the level of innovation: knowledge 
transfers and product market competition.  A recent model by Sutton (2007a) focuses on 
the first mechanism, while papers from Schumpeter (1943) to Aghion et al. (2005a, 
2005b and 2006) focus on the second one.  
Sutton (2007a) develops a model where a firm’s competitiveness depends not 
only on its productivity but also on the quality of its product, with productivity and 
quality jointly determining a firm’s “capability.” Consumers choose to buy on the basis 
of price-quality combinations and if a firm has a product whose quality is superior to that 
of its rivals, the firm will retain some level of market share even when the number of low 
quality rivals becomes arbitrarily large. Moreover, there is a lower bound on quality that 
any firm has to maintain in order to survive, thus creating a range (“window”) of quality 
                                                 
1 Various literatures examine the impact of globalization on efficiency of firms in emerging markets. For a 
review of the literature on foreign direct investment, see Gorg and Greenaway (2004); for a review of the 
trade literature, see Wagner (2007).   2
levels in which firms can operate. What matters is relative quality at both the firm and 
country levels, and with globalization (liberalization of trade and entry of foreign firms) 
the lower bound on the window of opportunity rises for local firms that were previously 
shielded from the competition of higher quality firms in advanced economies. 
An important prediction of the Sutton (2007a) model is that after an initial 
shakeout phase, firms in emerging markets will strive to adjust by raising their 
capabilities.
2 Sutton suggests that the process will be influenced by the vertical transfer of 
capabilities to the emerging market economies through the supply chain of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), an argument that is also present in the international business 
literature on FDI that we discuss below. Interestingly from the standpoint of our research, 
Sutton argues that  
“…it is the ‘middle group’ countries of Eastern Europe, along with China 
and India, who are best placed to be the most dramatic beneficiaries of the 
present globalisation, not – or not primarily – because of trade 
liberalization per se, but because of the virtuous dynamic that follows as 
part of the general package of liberalization of foreign direct investment 
and capability transfer.” (Sutton, 2007a, pp. 27-28) 
In parallel to Sutton’s work there is a large literature asking whether exporting and 
importing activities of domestic firms raises their efficiency – presumably through 
innovation that is induced by the exposure of the domestic firms to more advanced 
practices and technologies.
3 In line with Sutton’s conceptual framework and the trade 
literature, we test whether or not firms in emerging markets that enter the supply chain 
with foreign firms, or export and import, increase their innovative activities.   
The second broad literature on the effects of globalization emphasizes the 
relationship between product market competition and innovation by incumbent firms. 
Many economists have traditionally argued that competition is good for an economy by 
providing incentives for efficient organization of production, putting downward pressure 
on costs, and motivating innovation (e.g., Arrow(1962) and Gilbert and Newbery (1982)). 
On the other hand, Schumpeter (1943) argued that large firms operating in concentrated 
                                                 
2 This first shakeout phase has also been referred to as the reallocative effects of trade liberalization and 
entry of foreign firms.  For a theoretical and empirical paper focusing on the reallocative effects see Melitz 
(2003) and Pavcnik (2002), respectively.  These works suggest that globalization can raise the aggregate 
productivity via adjustments on the extensive margin (the exit of inefficient firms) rather than the intensive 
margin (productivity enhancements of incumbent firms). In the present study, we will be observing the 
effects on the remaining incumbent firms and hence examine the importance of adjustment on the intensive 
margin.   
3 See Wagner (2007) for a survey.    3
markets are the most powerful engine of progress and the most likely to innovate because 
they can more easily appropriate the returns from inventive activity. Similarly, Salop 
(1977), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Romer (1990), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) among 
others stress that that product market competition reduces monopoly rents that induce 
innovation. Recently, Aghion et al. (2004 and 2005a) have shown that competition can 
have different effects on firms/industries’ willingness to innovate depending on their 
level of efficiency (technology). In particular, firms close to the efficiency frontier (those 
with highest efficiency) are expected to be spurred by competition to innovate and 
increase their efficiency, while firms that are far from the frontier (near the lower bound 
of efficiency) are expected to be discouraged by competition from innovating. In Aghion 
et al. (2004) the prediction comes from a Schumpeterian model where incumbent firms 
that are closer to the frontier have an incentive to innovate when faced with potential 
(foreign) entrant in order to retain their market. Firms that are far from the frontier cannot 
compete with the more efficient entrant and competition simply reduces their expected 
benefits from innovation. Competition thus provides incentives for innovation for the 
more efficient domestic firms and a disincentive for the less efficient ones.  
In Aghion et al. (2005a) the argument is developed further by emphasizing pre- 
and post-innovation rents. Firms close to the efficiency frontier are expected to be 
spurred by competition to innovate and increase their efficiency because competition 
reduces their pre-innovation rents (rents obtained if the firms were not to innovate). 
Innovation enables these efficient firms to escape competition and thus increase their 
post-innovation rents.  In contrast, firms that are far from the frontier are expected to be 
discouraged by competition from innovating because competition affects negatively their 
post-innovation rents – innovation does not help these laggard firms escape competition. 
In the model, the proportion of laggard and efficient firms is endogenous and depends on 
equilibrium innovation intensities. When competition is low, there is a larger fraction of 
efficient (neck-and-neck competing) incumbent firms and the “escape-competition” 
effect is likely to dominate the Schumpeterian effect. When competition is high, there is a 
larger fraction of laggard firms with low profits and the Schumpeterian effect of 
competition on innovation is likely to dominate. The balance between the opposing 
effects of competition on the two types of firms enables Aghion et al. (2004, 2005a) to 
derive the prediction that the effect of the intensity of product market competition on the   4
extent of innovation is in the form of an inverted U -- a prediction that is in line with the 
earlier empirical findings by Kamien and Schwartz (1972) and Scherer (1967).
 4 The 
model also predicts that the inverted U curve is steeper for the more efficient firms than 
for the laggards, a result that is brought about by a positive interaction between the 
escape-competition effect and the proximity of the firm to the efficiency frontier.   
Finally, in a related model Aghion et al., (2005b) derive the prediction that firms 
located in more pro-business environments are more likely to respond to competition 
(threat of entry) by innovating. This is because the business-friendly environment enables 
these firms to be more efficient than firms in restrictive regulatory environments, and 
more efficient (as opposed to laggard) firms respond to competition by innovating. 
In the remainder of the paper, we test the following ceteris paribus predictions 
derived from the models described above:  
i.  Globalization increases product market competition in emerging markets and 
the predicted effect of competition on innovation by domestic firms depends 
on the underlying theoretical model:  
a.  The effect of competition on innovation is negative.  
b.  The effect of competition on innovation is positive.  
c.  The effect of competition on innovation is in the form of inverted U.  
d.  The effect of competition on innovation is positive for firms that are close 
to the efficiency frontier and negative for firms that are far from the 
frontier.  
e.  The inverted U relationship between competition and innovation is steeper 
among firms that are closer to the efficiency frontier. 
ii.  Globalization stimulates innovation by domestic firms in emerging market 
economies through the vertical transfer of capabilities, specifically: 
a.  Firms that supply a larger share of sales to MNEs innovate more than 
firms that sell more to the domestic market. 
b.  Firms that export a larger share of their sales innovate more than firms that 
sell more to the domestic market. 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, the theory does not directly predict an inverted U relationship but it does exclude the 
possibility of a U shaped relationship.   5
c.  Firms that import a larger share of their inputs innovate more than firms 
that buy a larger share of their inputs on the domestic market. 
iii.  Firms in regions with a more-business friendly environment are more likely to 
respond to competition with more innovation than firms in less-business 
friendly environments. 
1.2  Relevant Empirical Literature 
These opposing theoretical views on the relationship between competition and innovation 
have spawned an empirical literature, whose findings have been mixed. Following 
Schumpeter (1943), the early empirical literature identified a negative linear relationship, 
while Scherer (1967) and Kamien and Schwartz (1972) discovered an inverted U 
relationship between competition and innovation; Cohen and Levin (1989) in their review 
of this earlier literature conclude that the effect of concentration on innovation is 
sensitive to industry conditions, particularly in terms of technological opportunity and 
appropriability. In the 1990s empirical tests again focused on a linear relationship, with 
Geroski (1995), Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) presenting 
evidence that competition spurs innovation. More recently, research has focused on the 
inverted U and heterogeneous effects of competition on innovation.  
The tests of the inverted U hypothesis have yielded mostly but not completely 
supporting evidence. Whereas two studies using US and UK data provide some favorable 
evidence, one study using data from transition economies does not find support. Using 
the price cost margin (markup) as the competition indicator and citation-weighted patents 
as a measure of innovation, Aghion et al. (2005a) find an inverted U effect of competition 
on patents among 311 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1973 and 
1994.
5  Aghion et al. (2006) find that technologically advanced entry by foreign firms has 
a positive effect on innovation in sectors initially close to the frontier and that the effect 
of entry on total factor productivity growth interacts negatively with the distance to the 
frontier.  These findings are based on a much larger data set of over 23,000 
establishments in 180 4-digit manufacturing industries in the US and UK and a data set of 
patents in over 1,000 incumbent UK firms.   
Carlin, Schaeffer and Seabright (2004) also test the inverted U hypothesis using 
data on transition economies (1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
                                                 
5 They construct a two-digit SIC industry panel of 354 industry-year observations on these 311 firms.   6
Survey, BEEPs).  They examine the effect of product competition (defined as the number 
of competitors in the firm’s main product line) on innovation (defined as the number of 
innovative activities undertaken in introducing a new product or upgrading an existing 
one) and growth.  Using different variables and an earlier data set than we use, they reach 
one of the findings as we do, namely that innovation is higher in monopolistic industries. 
We build on these findings by using additional (2002 and 2005) BEEPS data, analyzing 
the effect of FDI on innovation, examining the effect of competition in greater depth, and 
integrating the effects of FDI and competition in a unified framework. 
The tests for the relationship between competition, firm heterogeneity (in terms of 
distance from the frontier) and firm performance yield fairly consistent results. Aghion et 
al. (2005b) analyze a three-digit-industry data available for all the states in India for the 
period 1980-97 and find that entry liberalization (de-licensing) led to an increase in 
within-industry inequality in output, labor productivity and total factor productivity, 
which is consistent with differential responses of firms in terms of innovation. 
Sabirianova, Svejnar and Terrell (2005a, 2005b) also find support for heterogeneous 
effects of firm entry on firm performance in Russian and Czech industrial firms. They 
find that entry by foreign firms in a given industry has a positive effect on the 
productivity of incumbent foreign firms (which are likely to be at or close to the frontier) 
but a negative effect on the productivity of incumbent domestic firms (which are likely to 
be laggards compared with foreign firms). 
Whereas no studies have as yet tested for the direct impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on domestic firms’ innovation, the ‘FDI spillover’ literature has tested 
for efficiency gains that domestic firms might obtain from the presence of foreign firms 
in upstream or downstream activities.
6  In general, the variable capturing ‘foreign firm 
presence’ has been constructed as the share of output in an industry produced by firms 
with foreign ownership; the upstream and downstream relationships between the 
domestic and foreign firms has typically been deduced from the backward and forward 
linkages in input-output tables.  The literature finds no positive efficiency effects in 
domestic firms that are in upstream relationships with foreign firms, but it detects large 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Gorg and Greenaway (2004) for a review of the FDI spillover literature.   7
positive efficiency gains in domestic firms that engage in downstream activities with 
(selling to) foreign firms.
7  
As mentioned earlier, there is considerable literature on the effects of exports and 
imports on productivity (Wagner 2007), but relatively little direct measurement of the 
effect of trade on innovation. This literature tends to find that exporting firms tend to 
have higher efficiency, but question which way the causality goes.  Finally, we know of 
no firm level evidence on differences in the business environment on level of innovation, 
although several theorists have raised questions regarding issues such as property rights 
and innovative activity (see e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991).    
1.3  Our Contribution 
Building on the literature that examines the effects of various channels of globalization 
on innovation and efficiency (“capability”), we make several contributions. First, we 
focus on innovation, which has not been much studied in emerging markets, rather than 
gains in productivity, which has been widely studied. This shift in focus is desirable 
because theories usually make predictions about the effects on innovation by firms rather 
than directly about the productivity effect (a derived effect). Second, our analysis nests 
various channels of globalization and thus we can assess the relative importance of 
different aspects of globalization for innovative activity of firms in emerging markets. 
Importantly, in contrast to previous literature we utilize information on direct connections 
of domestic firms with foreign firms (e.g., whether a domestic firm is a supplier to 
foreign firms) instead of the typical measures of foreign presence at the industry level. 
Third, we exploit a unique unified survey covering over 11,500 firms in a broad array of 
sectors in 27 countries. Thus, unlike other studies, we are able to analyze firms in both 
manufacturing and services and carry out comparative analysis to shed light on the 
significance of various institutional factors (e.g., pro-business environment) in promoting 
innovations.   
Briefly, our main findings are that (i) supplying multinationals as well as 
exporting and importing (vertical relationships) induce innovation by domestic firms, (ii) 
firms that have market power tend to innovate more, but greater pressure from foreign 
competition also stimulates innovation; (iii) there is no evidence for an inverted U 
relationship between innovation and competition in either the more efficient or laggard 
                                                 
7 See e.g., Blalock and Gertler (2008), Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2007) and Javorcik (2004).    8
firms, and (iv) the relationship between globalization and innovation does not vary across 
the manufacturing and service sectors or with differences in the business environment. 
 
2.  Data and Econometric Specification 
 
To test the predictions outlined in the previous section, we use data from the 2002 and 
2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a joint 
initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the 
World Bank Group. These are large surveys of 6,500 firms in 2002 and 7,900 firms in 
2005 in 27 transition countries. The surveys relied on the same sampling frames and 
identical questionnaires in all countries. To ensure that the samples cover adequately 
most types of firms, the surveys used stratified random sampling.
8  For example, in each 
country, the sectoral composition of the sample in terms of manufacturing
9 versus 
services
10 was determined by their relative contribution to GDP.  Firms that operate in 
sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision, such as 
banking, electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water, were excluded from 
the sample.  The sample includes very small firms with as few as two employees and 
firms with up to 10,000 employees.  Moreover, the data include firms in the rural areas as 
well as large cities.  Hence these data enable us to analyze diverse firms in a large 
number of countries, and an important feature is the inclusion of firms in the service 
sector, which is the new dynamic (yet understudied) sector in these economies. 
In addition, the data set contains a panel component, where 1,443 firms that were 
surveyed in 2002 were surveyed again in 2005.
11 We use these panel data for robustness 
checks, where we verify that the timing of the variables in our baseline econometric 
specifications does not affect our results. However, our analysis relies primarily on the 
                                                 
8 In both years the surveys were administered to Turkey, 15 countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) and 11 countries from the 
former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan,  Ukraine and Uzbekistan).  In neither year could the survey be administered in Turkmenistan. 
9 Manufacturing includes mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing and agro-processing. 
10 Services includes: Transportation, storage and communications; wholesale, retail, repairs; real estate, 
business services; hotels and restaurants; other community, social and personal activities; and commerce. 
11 The relatively small size of the panel should not be associated with intensive exit of firms in these 
countries.  The exit rate was about 8% (average across countries).  The size of the panel is mainly brought 
about by a refusal of firms to participate in the new wave of the survey (42%) and inability to reach eligible 
responders within firms (25%).    9
pooled 2002 and 2005 data since many variables of interest have a retrospective 
component in each survey date and because it is hard to detect robust relationships with a 
small panel of heterogeneous firms, especially when we use many control variables. 
An important advantage of our data is that firms self-report various types of 
innovation activity.  Most studies on innovation use patent data or R&D expenditures, 
which are regarded as problematic. Patents are generally viewed as having three 
weaknesses: 1) they measure inventions rather than innovations; 2) the tendency to patent 
varies across countries, industries and processes; and 3) firms often use methods other 
than patents to protect their innovations (such as maintaining technological complexity, 
industrial secrecy, and lead time over competitors). Using R&D expenditures may also be 
inappropriate because not all innovations are generated by R&D expenditures, R&D does 
not necessarily lead to innovation (they are an input rather than an output), and formal 
R&D measures are biased against small firms (Michie, 1998; Archibugi and Sirilli, 
2001).
12 Perhaps most important for the purposes of this paper is the fact that in emerging 
market economies these types of innovations are less likely to be observed as firms are 
expected to engage more in imitation and adaptation of already created and tested 
innovations, rather than in generating new inventions and are less likely to expend 
resources on R&D. 
In this study, we define innovation broadly as the development and upgrading of 
new products, adoption of new technologies or obtaining quality certifications. 
Specifically, we use binary variables based on answers to the question about whether 
firms have undertaken any of the following initiatives in the last three years: 
•  Developed successfully a major new product line or upgraded an existing 
product line – hereafter New Product; 
•  Acquired new production technology -- hereafter New Technology;  
•  Obtained a new quality accreditation (such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000, 
AGCCP, etc.) -- hereafter New Accreditation.   
                                                 
12 While many firms are reluctant to report the level of R&D expenditures, most are willing to indicate 
whether they have positive expenditures on R&D. Using a dummy variable for positive R&D expenditures 
as the dependent variable in our econometric specification (discussed below), we find similar results to 
those based on our survey measures. We are hence relatively confident that our survey-based measures of 
innovations are sensible indicators of innovative activity of firms.    10
As noted above, since we are studying emerging market economies, it is expected that 
these three measures of innovation may have some element of imitation or adoption 
rather than “in house development.”  We know for example, that the new technology 
used in the firm can be acquired in a number of ways.  It can be developed by the firm 
(17% who answered that they acquired a new technology gave this as the way it was 
acquired) or it can be acquired by hiring new personnel (5%) or transferred from 
elsewhere (universities, business associations, etc., 3%).  However, the vast majority 
acquired new technology embodied in new machinery or equipment that was purchased 
or licensed from other sources (75%).
13  
Given that the respondent’s determination of whether a new product
14 was 
developed or upgraded is subjective, we also use the variable New Accreditation as a 
formal affirmation that the quality of the product has been upgraded according to some 
widely accepted standards.  For example, ISO 9000 is a family of standards for quality 
management systems, maintained by the International Organization for Standardization 
and administered by accreditation and certification bodies.
15  However, in order to ensure 
the quality of a product, the standards monitor the process by which a product is 
manufactured or delivered.
16  Hence New Accreditation captures “process innovation” as 
well as “product/service innovation.” 
The BEEPS data also permit us to capture in various ways the degree of 
competition faced by each firm.  A key variable, which is comparable with the one used 
by Aghion et al. (2005a) and Nickell (1996), is markup, or the price to cost ratio.
17  Firms 
that are able to charge a larger markup are deemed to have less competition.  The 
                                                 
13 One may be concerned that a vast majority of new technology is due to imitation and wonder whether 
our results extend to genuine in-house innovations made within firms.  We applied our econometric 
specification (discussed below) to two in-house measures of innovation – positive R&D expenditures and 
“new technology developed by the firm” -- and found very similar effects.   
14 Note that the variable “New Product” includes also a new service. 
15 Although the standards originated in manufacturing, during WWII when there were quality problems in 
many British high-tech industries, they are now employed across a wide range of sectors. A “product”, in 
ISO vocabulary, can mean a physical object, or services. 
16 For example, the requirements in ISO 9001 (one of the standards in the ISO 9000 family) include: a) a 
set of procedures that cover all key processes in the business; b) monitoring processes to ensure they are 
effective; c) keeping adequate records; d) checking output for defects, with appropriate corrective action 
where necessary; e) regularly reviewing individual processes and the quality system itself for effectiveness; 
and f) facilitating continual improvement.  
17 Note that we do not compute markup using price and cost information provided by firms.  If there are 
measurement errors in prices, costs and quantities, the constructed markup may be correlated with 
measured productivity, which is not desirable.  Fortunately, markup is self-reported by firms in the survey 
and therefore it is less likely that we have spurious correlation between markup and productivity.     11
advantage of this indicator over a market share or Herfindahl index is that it does not 
require precise definition of geographic and product markets, which is difficult to obtain 
in emerging market economies that vary considerably by size and geographic reach of 
firms.
18 We are also able to capture the effects of pressure from foreign competition by 
using two dummy variables:  “low” (slightly important) and “medium-high” (fairly and 
very important), with “not important” as the base response.  (See a description of the 
variables in appendix Table A1.) 
Foreign firms can spur innovation among domestic firms through competition but 
they can also directly transfer capabilities.  BEEPS also permits us to capture the extent 
of vertical linkages between domestic and foreign firms, which allow for transfer of 
capabilities or “spillovers.” We use three variables for vertical linkages: SMNE, the share 
of a firm’s sales to multinational enterprises;
19 Exports, share of sales exported; and 
Imports, share of inputs imported.  
To test whether firms that are further away from the efficiency frontier innovate 
less than firms that are closer to the frontier, we define the frontier as  the best (the most 
efficient one-third of) foreign firms (within an industry, country and year) and then 
calculate each domestically-owned firm’s distance from the frontier.  We would like to 
use total factor productivity (TFP or the Solow residual) to measure the distance from the 
frontier because it is the most intuitive measure.
 20  However, since firms are reluctant to 
report levels of sales, capital, and other key variables, we can only compute TFP for less 
than one-half of the firms in our sample.  Hence, we use distance from the frontier based 
on TFP in our robustness check but in our baseline specifications we propose an 
alternative measure of distance that allows us to keep the sample size as large as possible.  
Specifically, we draw on the literature on matching (e.g., Rosembaum, 2002) and 
measure the distance between a domestically-owned firm and the leading foreign-owned 
firms in an industry and country with the Mahalanobis distance, which assumes that firms 
that are similar in a set of observed characteristics are likely to have similar efficiency. 
Conversely, if the observed characteristics of domestic firms are different from those of 
                                                 
18 The BEEPS data also supply self-reported information on the number of competitors that a firm faces 
locally and nationally.  We do not use these data since the number of firms does not necessarily capture 
competition but rather the “reallocation effect.”  As Sutton (2007b) argues, an increase in competition can 
lead to higher concentration (intensive margin) and a lower number of firms surviving in the market 
(extensive margin). 
19 An MNE is defined as a firm with 50% or more foreign ownership. 
20 See equation (2) for more details on how we compute the Solow residual.    12
the best foreign-owned firms, the domestic firms are likely to be less efficient than the 
best foreign-owned firms. One may hence interpret this difference as the distance from 
the best business practice of foreign-owned firms. The Mahalanobis distance of domestic 
firm i to a foreign firm is equal to:  
           m i n          




     
      
    
Where superscript F denotes the best foreign-owned firms and superscript D denotes 
domestic companies. Sx is the covariance matrix of the vector of observed characteristics 
x. The inverse of the covariance matrix of observable characteristics x works as a 
weighting matrix which takes into account the correlations between variables (no double 
counting) and makes the units of measurement and relative variability in x irrelevant.  For 
example, if x consists of two uncorrelated variables capacity utilization CU and 
employment L and there is only one foreign firm, then the distance from the frontier for a 
domestic firm i is            
         
 
         
       
 
        where CU
F is capacity utilization of 
the foreign firm, L
F is employment of the foreign firm, and var(CU) and var(L) are the 
variance of capacity utilization and employment in the sample, respectively.  If there is 
more than one foreign firm embodying the frontier, we take the distance to the closest 
foreign firm.  
The vector of observed characteristics x contains the size of the firm in terms of 
the logarithm of number of employees and number of establishments; the structure of 
employment in terms of educational attainment  (share with, vocational school, secondary 
school, college; skill level as well as share of managers, share of professional workers) 
and share of permanent workers; capacity utilization in terms of machinery and labor; 
markup; share owned by largest shareholder(s); growth rates (of sales and capital); a 
dummy for paying for security. We match firms exactly by industry, country and year, 
i.e., domestic firms are matched only to foreign-owned firms in the same industry, 
country and year. Since the distance is skewed, we take log 1             as  the 
distance from the frontier in our specification.  The larger the Mahalanobis distance, the 
further the domestic firm is from the best foreign firms in its industry/country.   
We find that the Mahalanobis distance is correlated with the TFP-based distance. 
The raw correlation between the variables is 0.21, which is substantial given the amount 
of heterogeneity observed in the data. Furthermore, the correlation remains almost   13
equally strong even after we control for other factors such as industry, country and time 
fixed effects.  Hence, although conceptually perhaps less appealing than the TFP-based 
distance,
21 the Mahalanobis distance is a reasonably good proxy for distance from the 
frontier.
  
We estimate the following baseline probit specification with the pooled data in the 
2002 and 2005 BEEPS for domestically owned firms (i.e., with no foreign ownership):  
       Φ                                 
                                              log  1                 
         ,               ,    
 
          ,                ,              
                                                                   (1) 
where I is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reported an innovation, and zero 
otherwise; Φ  denotes c.d.f. of a standard normal random variable; i, s, c, and t index 
firms, sector, country, and time, respectively. Variables dated with period  3 t −  are taken 
from retrospective questions about the firm’s performance three years prior to the current 
date. The first two variables capture our measures of competition: Markup, and ForComp 
(pressure from foreign competition). We also estimate a specification with Markup 
squared. The next three explanatory variables capture vertical linkages or transfer of 
capabilities: SMNE -- the share of sales to multinational enterprises, Export -- the share of 
export in sales, and Import -- the share of imported inputs.
22  The variable distance is the 
(Mahalanobis) distance from the technological frontier. The following set of variables 
control for a number of firm-specific factors deemed to be important in the literature:
23  
L (the number of employees) and L
2 measure the size of the firm. The argument 
for including size is that large companies have more resources to innovate and can benefit 
from economies of scale in R&D production and marketing.
24   
                                                 
21 Admittedly, the similarity of observed characteristics does not always imply that firms have the same 
level of productivity.  See Clark (1987), Baily and Gersbasch (1995) and Schmitz (2005) for examples.  
22 Note that in contrast to previous literature we have firm-level variables describing linkages instead of 
industry-level variables (e.g., Bertschek 1995).  
23 See Becheikh, Landry and Amara (2006) and Cohen (2005) for reviews of literature on innovation. 
24 This variable is probably one of the most studied firm characteristics determining innovation, in part 
because it is also one of Schumpeter’s (1943) hypotheses.    14
EDU (the share of workers with a university education) and SKILL (the share of 
skilled workers) capture human capital in the firm.  These variables might be expected to 
be positively correlated with innovation if EDU reflects the involvement of workers in 
R&D and more skilled workers (SKILL) are able to give feedback to the firm on how to 
improve a product. 
Age of the firm is the log of the number of years since the firm began operations 
in the country. Two hypotheses are plausible: one suggesting that older firms developed 
routines that are resistant to innovation and another suggesting that older firms will 
accumulate the knowledge necessary to innovate. There is evidence for both hypotheses. 
CNM is a dummy equal to one if the firm competes in the national markets and 
zero otherwise. We expect CNM to have a positive effect on innovation, given that the 
firm operates in a larger market. 
SOE  (State Owned Enterprise) is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
government owns 50% or more of the firm and zero otherwise. This variable is expected 
to be negatively correlated with innovation for a variety of reasons, including a poor 
system of rewards for innovative activities in these enterprises.  
  Finally, location (Loc) is a set of dummies for size of population where the firm is 
operating and    ,   ,     is a set of industry, country, and time fixed effects. Controlling 
for industry, country and time fixed effects is important because certain industries, 
countries or time periods may be more prone to report introduction of new goods, 
technologies, and accreditation and we do not want to bias our results if our regressors 
systematically co-vary with these episodes of more intensive reporting of innovative 
activity.   
We report in appendix Table A1 a detailed description of the variables and in 
appendix Table A2 their means and standard deviations for the whole sample of 
domestically owned firms (defined as firms with zero share of foreign ownership).  As 
may be seen from Table A2, there is considerable variation in the key variables. 
3.  Main Findings  
We begin in Section 3.1 by presenting estimates of equation (1), which tests the main 
hypotheses (i.a-c and ii.a-c) of Section 1. In Section 3.2 we confront issues of   15
endogeneity and carry out robustness checks.  Once these issues are resolved, we proceed 
with testing the more-nuanced hypotheses (i.d, i.e. and iii.) in Section 4. 
 
 
3.1  Baseline Specification 
Our baseline specification for each of the three types of innovation, estimated with over 
11,500 firm-level observations in the 27 countries, using location, country, industry and 
time fixed effects is reported in Table 1. The first finding is that product market 
competition, as proxied by markup, has a negative effect on innovation.  In particular, the 
larger the markup (implying less competition), the greater the probability that a firm 
develops a new product or acquires new technology.  The corresponding marginal effect 
of increasing markup by 10 percentage points, which is approximately one standard 
deviation of the markup in the sample, is associated with a 2.1 to 2.3 percentage point 
increase in the probability of introducing a new good or a new technology (see appendix 
Table A3 for marginal effects).  This is a substantial increase given that unconditional 
probabilities of reporting a new product and a new technology are 56 and 30 percent, 
respectively.  In other words, a one standard deviation increase in the markup increases 
innovative activity by 4.1 to 7.7 percent.  On the other hand, product market competition 
does not have an effect on the third dimension of innovation, namely obtaining a new 
accreditation.  
As shown in Table 1, we have also tested for the inverted U hypothesis by 
estimating a specification with markup  and  markup
2. The estimated coefficient on 
markup
2 is not significantly different from zero and we hence do not find support for the 
inverted U shaped relationship between competition and innovation. Our baseline 
specification supports the basic Schumpeterian view that monopolistic market structures 
boost innovative activity, providing support to hypothesis i.a and rejecting hypotheses i.b 
and i.c.  
Recall that in addition to markup, we include among the explanatory variables 
pressure from foreign competition. In Table 1 we find that greater pressure from foreign 
competition has a positive effect on innovation, holding constant markup and vertical 
linkages with foreign firms.  Firms feeling that pressure from foreign competition is 
“medium and high” are more likely to upgrade their product, acquire a new technology   16
and obtain new accreditation than firms that feel this pressure is “not at all important.” 
Firms that feel that the pressure is “low” have coefficient estimates that are about or 
slightly more than one-half of those for “medium-high” pressure. (These smaller 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent test levels for “new technology,” 
at the 10 percent level for “new product,” and not significant for “new accreditation.”)  
The economic significance of competitive pressure from foreign firms is also important 
for innovations in products and technology: converted to marginal effects, the estimated 
coefficients in Table 1 (marginal effects are in Appendix Table A3) indicate that 
reporting low pressure is associated with approximately 2.5 percentage point higher 
innovative activity, while reporting medium-high pressure is associated with 5.0 
percentage point higher innovative activity. However, medium-high pressure from 
foreign firms only increases new accreditation by 1.4 percentage points. We conclude 
that the processes of developing or upgrading a new product and acquiring a new 
technology are influenced by the forces of product market or foreign competition, while 
the process of obtaining a new accreditation is affected only by medium-high pressure 
from foreign companies.   
Vertical transfer of capability from foreign to domestic firms -- stressed by Sutton 
(2007a) and the FDI spillover literature -- is significant. As may be seen in Table 1, firms 
that have stronger vertical relationships with multinationals, either domestically (by 
supplying them) or out of the country (by exporting or importing), innovate more than 
firms that have weaker relationships with multinationals. A one percentage point increase 
in a domestic firm’s share of sales to MNEs or to exports has a very similar impact on the 
first two types of innovation and a larger positive impact on acquiring a new accreditation.  
Holding everything else constant, increasing the share of sales to MNEs or foreign 
markets as well as the share of imported inputs by one standard deviation is associated 
with increasing innovation by roughly 2 to 5 percentage points, which is approximately a 
5 to 10% increase in the innovative success.  A firm’s share of inputs imported is a bit 
less influential in obtaining a new accreditation than it is in upgrading a product or 
acquiring a new technology, but overall vertical transfers of capability are statistically 
and economically strong for all types of innovation.  While this is not one of our 
hypotheses related to competition, it is interesting to note that firms that are further away 
from the frontier (in terms of the Mahalanobis distance) are less likely to innovate in   17
terms of developing a new product or acquiring new technology. Increasing the distance 
to foreign firms by one standard deviation decreases innovative activity by approximately 
one percentage point, which is a relatively modest amount.  As with markup, distance is 
not significantly related to obtaining a new quality accreditation, although the sign and 
point estimate of the coefficient is similar to those for the other two types of innovation.  
There are a number of other interesting findings with respect to the control 
variables reported in Table 1. First, larger firms tend to innovate more than smaller firms, 
which is consistent with the finding in the vast majority of the studies on innovation (see 
e.g., Becheikh, Landry, and Amara (2006)) and Schumpeter’s (1943) hypothesis.  The 
size effect is linear (and with very similar coefficients) for new product and new 
technology, but for new accreditation it is increasing at a decreasing rate.  Second, the 
effect of human capital varies by how it is measured. Having a higher share of skilled 
workers does not affect the probability of developing a new product, acquiring new 
technology, or obtaining a new accreditation. On the other hand, as the share of workers 
with a university education rises, all three types of innovation are boosted. The finding 
that having a higher share of labor force with university education is more conducive to 
innovation than having a higher share of skilled labor, stresses the need for a highly 
educated labor force to improve the capabilities of the product or service.  To take an 
extreme example, a firm with 100% of its employee having a university degree would be 
a 6 to 10 percentage points more innovative than a firm with no university-educated 
employees. Third, older (more mature) firms are not as likely to innovate with respect to 
product and technology but have the same probability of obtaining a new accreditation as 
new firms. For example, a ten year old firm has a 2 percentage points lower innovative 
output relative to a newly born firm.  Fourth, state-owned firms are 10 percentage points 
less likely to innovate than privately owned firms in terms of product or technology but 
are not different with respect to acquiring a new accreditation. Finally, firms that 
compete/operate in national markets are more likely to innovate in any of the three areas 
than firms that only compete/operate in a local or regional market.  This may reflect both 
the capability of the firms operating in the larger national market, as well as the 
characteristics of the national as opposed to local environment.   
In concluding this section, we note that the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables are less often significant for obtaining a new accreditation than for upgrading a   18
product or acquiring a new technology.  These results suggest that something particular is 
driving the process of accreditation. We conjecture that because the coefficients on 
downstream linkages with MNEs are relatively large for obtaining a new accreditation 
compared to those for the other two types of innovation, accreditation may be obtained as 
a precondition for selling to MNEs and exporting. It also appears to be stimulated by 
medium-high pressure from competition by foreign firms but not by product market 
competition. 
 
3.2  Econometric Issues and Robustness Checks 
The baseline specification potentially has issues of endogeneity of our firm-level 
measures of competition, transfer of capabilities and distance to the frontier. We first 
tackle these issues and then carry out a robustness checks for our Mahalanobis measure 
of the distance to the frontier.  
 
Endogeneity of Markup   
Is the innovative activity being spurred by the market structure or is the market structure 
the result of the innovative activity? If, for example, firms successfully innovate, they 
may be able to gain a higher share of the market and prevent entry of new firms into the 
market (as noted for example by Aghion et al., 2005a, and Blundell, Griffith and Van 
Reenen, 1999).  Unfortunately, economic theory does not make clear predictions about 
the sign of the bias.  Both positive and negative feedbacks between markup and 
innovation are possible.  Another source of endogeneity can be measurement error, which 
leads to attenuation bias.  
Variables that capture the regulation of an industry might be considered good 
instrumental variables (IV) for markup since they affect entry of new firms but not 
necessarily innovative activity. BEEPS provides several questions about regulations, of 
which we selected the following two: 
Q1. Thinking now of unofficial payments/gifts that a firm like yours would make 
in a given year, could you please tell me how often would they make 
payments/gifts for the following purposes  [score on 1 (Never) to 6 (Always) 
scale]:  
a)  To obtain business licenses and permits; 
b)  To deal with occupational health and safety inspections; 
c)  To deal with fire and building inspections; 
d)  To deal with environmental inspections;   19
e)  To influence the content of new legislation, rules, decrees etc. 
Q2. Can you tell me how problematic are these different factors for the operation 
and growth of your business [score on 1 (No obstacle) to 4 (Major obstacle) 
scale]: 
a)  Access to land; 
b)  Title or leasing of land; 
c)  Customs and trade regulations; 
d)  Business licensing and permits; 
e)  Labor regulations. 
The advantage of these questions is that they provide a measure of entry barriers at the 
firm level -- in contrast to the previous literature, which used more aggregated variables 
such as movements in exchange rates and changes in tariffs (e.g., Bertrand, 2004; Aghion 
et al., 2005).  This difference is important because variability at the firm level dwarfs 
variability at the macroeconomic level and thus our instruments are much more 
informative.  At the same time, Q1 and Q2, by capturing barriers to entry, preserve the 
spirit of the instrumental variables used in the previous literature.   
The aforementioned questions provide many potential instruments because a 
firm’s response to each sub-question in Q1 and Q2 is a possible instrument that varies on 
a scale from one to four or one to six. However, any given question may be a weak 
instrument when taken individually because these questions capture different facets of 
barriers to entry and one may need to look at the holistic picture rather than any 
individual aspect to understand impediments to entry. To address this issue, we construct 
an “index of barriers to entry” by normalizing firm’s answers to each question to have the 
same scale and variability (a standard deviation of one) and then summing up the 
normalized responses across all questions (Q1a-Q1e, Q2a-Q2e) for each firm.
25  This 
index provides a simple summary statistic for various impediments that firms face in 
starting or operating a business.  Larger values of the index are interpreted as higher 
barriers to entry.  
To verify that this statistic provides a meaningful measure of barriers to entry, we 
have regressed measures of firm profitability (from BEEPS) as well as industry level 
entry, survival and firm turnover (from Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2004) on 
the index.  The results, reported in Table 2, suggest that a larger value of our index is 
                                                 
25 We also explored an alternative strategy when we choose instruments using formal statistical selection 
criteria developed by Andrews (1999) and Hall and Peixe (2003). These criteria select correctly excluded 
variables with strong predictive power as instruments.  The results with this alternative strategy are 
qualitatively similar to those that we present in the paper.    20
associated with a higher incidence of positive profits and lower firm turnover (and entry 
rate in particular), as well as higher firm survival rates. All of these findings are 
consistent with industries being more protected when the index is higher. We conclude 
that the index indeed captures barriers to entry and, hence, we may expect it to serve as a 
reasonable instrumental variable for markup.   
The IV results are presented in Table 3.  We find that our instrument has a strong 
first stage fit. For example, the first-stage F-statistic suggests that excluded variables have 
strong predictive power for the markup.  Likewise Anderson’s canonical correlation test 
rejects the null that the instruments are irrelevant.  Although the point estimates in the IV 
specification are greater than the point estimates in the standard probit,
26 both sets of 
estimates convey the same message: greater market power spurs innovation in 
introducing new products and adopting new technologies, and it has no effect on the 
acquisition of new accreditation. These results are similar to those of Aghion et al. 
(2005a) who also find that corrections for the endogeneity of markup do not change the 
qualitative results.   
Although some questions about barriers to entry are phrased to ask about “firms 
like yours,” one could be concerned that the firm’s own answer may be correlated with 
some unobserved characteristics of the firm.  We address this problem by instrumenting 
markup with an alternative index of barriers to entry, which is the average over all other 
firms’ answers in a given industry, country and year.   With this alternative instrument, 
the point estimates are smaller but the qualitative results are the same: larger markups are 
associated with more innovation.
27,28   
Because the IV estimates have relatively large confidence intervals and in many 
cases we cannot reject the equality of the estimates from IV and the standard probit, we 
proceed with the standard probit estimates in the rest of the paper. 
 
                                                 
26 If our IV is correcting for measurement error in markup, it should remove attenuation bias and result in a 
larger coefficient.   
27 We find similar qualitative results when we use a linear probability model; hence, our results are not 
driven by non-linearities. 
28 Own survey responses about markup may be correlated with some characteristics of firms or may contain 
measurement errors. To assess the importance of these concerns, we experimented with the average markup 
of all other firms in the industry/country/year as a measure of competition. Our results are broadly similar 
to the baseline estimates, although the point estimates based on this alternative measure of market power 
are somewhat larger (which is consistent with smaller measurement errors in the alternative indicator of 
competition).   21
Robustness of the Distance Measure   
To test the robustness of the Mahalanobis distance measure, we re-estimate the baseline 
equation with a measure that captures differences in efficiency using the Solow residual 
or total factor productivity (TFP).  We compute the Solow residual with the cost share for 
labor, material and capital (computed for each firm and aggregated for a given industry in 
each country and year) and adjust it for capacity utilization (CU):  
                                        
                 
                
                         ,   (2) 
where  i,  s,  c, and t index firms, industries, countries and time,     
  ,    
 ,    
   are  labor, 
materials and capital cost shares, Y is sales, L is number of employees, M is the value of 
materials and K is the replacement value of capital. We then estimate the Solow distance 
measure as the difference between log TFP of the top third of the most efficient foreign 
firms in a given industry and country and log TFP of each domestic firm in the same 
industry and country.
29    
Using the Solow measure is problematic in our data since only about one-half of 
the firms report sales revenue and even fewer report capital.  Yet with only 5,548 firm 
observations, we find that the coefficients on Solow distance measure are similar to those 
of the Mahalanobis distance in suggesting that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between distance and innovation (Table 4).  Hence, our basic results are 
robust to alternative measures of the distance from the frontier.  Because we lose so many 
observations with the TFP-based measure of distance, we continue to use the 
Mahalanobis distance in the rest of the paper. 
 
Reverse Causality (Endogeneity) due to timing of measurement of variables.  
Our variables for competition, vertical transfer of capabilities and distance are reported in 
the years of the survey (2002 and 2005), while innovation is measured over the preceding 
three-year periods (1999-2002 and 2002-2005, respectively). As a result, there is a 
potential problem that the causality runs from the dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables such that, for example, firms that have innovated are able to sell more to MNEs 
than firms that have not innovated. We address this potential problem in two ways.  
First, the reverse causality is less of a problem if the values of the explanatory 
variables in question (sales to MNEs, export, import, foreign competition, and markup) 
                                                 
29 Similar to computing the Mahalanobis distance, the top third of foreign firms is defined as the set of 
firms with TFP above the 66
th percentile.    22
do not vary much over a given three-year period. Within the subsample of about 1,000 
BEEPs firms for which we could link the 2002 and 2005 survey data and hence create a 
panel, the correlation coefficients between the 2002 and 2005 values of Exports, Imports 
and  SMNE, respectively, are relatively high -- 0.95, 0.93 and 0.42. The foreign 
competition variables are dummy variables and the probability of reporting the same 
value (staying in the same group) is around 50%. The only variable that has a relatively 
low correlation between 2002 and 2005 values is markup (0.2). All but one of these 
coefficients hence show considerable persistence, especially when one considers that a 
number of the variables are expressed as shares.  
Second, we replicate our estimates on the panel subsample of BEEPs firms, which 
allows us to regress innovation measured for the period 2002-2005 on the 2002 values of 
competition, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier. By construction, these 
“initial value” regressions eliminate the possibility that the relationship between a firm’s 
innovation and competition, vertical transfers, and distance from the frontier is brought 
about by contemporaneous shocks to these variables, or by reverse causality. However, 
because the panel subsample is much smaller than the entire sample, we must use a more 
parsimonious specification.  Therefore, we check whether and how our findings are 
affected by the change in specification and the smaller sample size. In particular, we 
include only the country and industry fixed effects as control variables and exclude the 
nine control variables in equation (1). Moreover, we include the competition variables 
one at a time. Finally, because of the small sample size and the fact that the majority of 
the non-zero values in the share of sales to MNEs, share of exports and share of imports 
variables are close to unity (greater than 90%), we convert these variables from shares 
into dummy variables, where 0 = no share of sales to MNEs, exports, etc.   
In order to assess what drives the difference, if any, between the estimates from 
the full sample and panel data, we estimate the more parsimonious specification for 
various samples: 
(a) the full sample, using pooled 2002 and 2005 data on all firms and current 
(contemporaneous) values of the explanatory variables, as in the base specification;  
(b) the pooled 2002 and 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of 
the explanatory variables;    23
(c) the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using current values of the explanatory 
variables; and  
(d) the 2005 data on the panel of firms, using three year lagged values of the 
explanatory variables.  
The model in (a) reveals whether the more parsimonious specification applied to 
the full sample yields similar results to those in the base specification reported in Table 1. 
It also provides a benchmark against which to compare the estimates from the panel 
subsample. The estimation in (b) is identical to that in (a) except that it uses the panel 
subsample of firms. Comparing the estimates in (b) to those in (a) hence permits us to 
establish whether for the purposes of our study the panel is a representative subsample of 
the full sample. The estimation in (c) is identical to (b) but uses only the 2005 part (i.e., 
the more recent half) of the panel. Comparing the estimates in (c) to those from (b) 
permits us to infer how much significance, if any, we lose by using just the more recent 
half of the panel data observations. Finally, the results in (d) represent the ideal 
specification, which explains innovation over the 2002-05 period with the lagged (2002) 
values of the explanatory variables.
30 Comparing the results in (c) and (d) enables us to 
assess the difference in the estimated coefficients between the specification using the 
current v. the lagged values of the explanatory variables.  
The coefficients from each of these four specifications are presented in Table 5 
for the competition, transfer of capability and distance variables. First, a comparison of 
the coefficients in columns (a) of each panel in Table 5 to the coefficients in Table 1 
indicates that applying the more parsimonious model to the full sample yields similar 
coefficient signs, estimates and significance on all the variables with the only notable 
difference being that the coefficients on pressure from foreign competition are somewhat 
larger in the parsimonious specification.  
A comparison of the results in columns (a) with columns (b) in each of the three 
panels of Table 5 indicates that going from over 11,500 observations in the full pooled 
sample to about 2,000 observations in the pooled panel data, holding constant the 
specification, maintains the signs and in most instances also the significance of the key 
coefficients. The only significant change in sign occurs for the coefficient on markup for 
new technology.  
                                                 
30 This uses data from the 2005 part of the panel for the dependent variable and data from the 2002 part of 
the panel for the explanatory variables.   24
Comparing columns (b) and (c) in each of the three panels of Table 5 
demonstrates that going from the 2,000 pooled panel observations for 2002 and 2005 to 
just 1,000 observations for 2005 (but estimating the same equation which still has 
contemporaneous values of the independent variables) maintains all signs and reduces the 
significance of just two coefficients. Finally, moving from columns (c) to (d), i.e., using 
the lagged (2002) rather than the current (2005) values of the explanatory variables with 
the 2005 panel observations reduces the significance on three and increases the 
significance on another three of the twenty four coefficients. Interestingly, in the three 
cases where the coefficients become significant (markup for new technology and SMNE 
for New Product and New Technology), they also become similar to the corresponding 
coefficients in the full sample estimates in column (a) of Table 5 and the corresponding 
coefficients in the base model in Table 1. 
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that using the large pooled sample of 2002 
and 2005 data with the current values of the competition, transfer of capability and 
distance variables is a reasonable empirical strategy that does not generate major biases 
in the estimated coefficients.
31  
4.  Additional Findings 
 
In this section we proceed with testing the remaining predictions outlined in Section 1, 
namely whether the effects of competition and vertical transfer of capabilities on 
innovation vary with the efficiency level of firms and the business environment.  Given 
the nature of our data, unlike other studies we are able to estimate these effects separately 
for manufacturing and services and see if the results are materially different across these 
two sectors.   
  
4.1  Firm Heterogeneity and Innovation 
The key predictions from the Aghion et al. (2004, 2005a) models are that (a) firms closer 
to the frontier are spurred by competition to innovate, while those far from the frontier 
                                                 
31 For the export share we can construct t − 3 values using retrospective questions about growth rates of 
export (including the first year of export status) and sales as well as the current year information on the 
export share in total sales and the level of sales. We report results for this measure in appendix Table A4. 
The estimated coefficients are nearly identical to the results reported in the baseline specification. 
However, we do not use this measure in our analysis because many firms are reluctant to report the level of 
sales and hence the sample size for the regressions based on export share dated at t − 3 shrinks to about 
6,000 observations.   25
are discouraged from innovating (prediction i.d), and (b) the inverted U relationship 
between competition and innovation is steeper among firms that are closer to the frontier 
(prediction i.e). In order to test these predictions, we estimate equation (1) separately for 
three groups of firms, according to where they lie  in the Mahalanobis distance to the 
frontier -- the closest one-third (“Close”), middle one-third (“Middle”) and farthest one-
third (“Far”). 
Examining the coefficients on markup and pressure from foreign competition in 
the Close, Middle and Far columns of Table 6, we find no systematic support for either of 
these hypotheses. Firms with higher markup are actually more likely to develop new 
products if they are not close to the frontier, more likely to acquire new technology if 
they are either close or far from the frontier (but not in the middle), not more or less 
likely to obtain accreditation irrespective where they are relative to the frontier.
32   
Medium and high pressure from foreign competition spurs product and technology 
innovation among firms that are ‘close to’ as well as ‘far from’ the frontier.  Interestingly, 
firms that are far from the frontier are the only ones to register a statistically positive 
effect of medium-high pressure from foreign competition on the probability of obtaining 
accreditation, but one cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same for firms that 
are close to the frontier. 
A key hypothesis with respect to the relationship between vertical transfer of 
capabilities and innovation found in the FDI literature is that firms closer to the frontier 
are in a better position than firms farther from the frontier to imitate (absorb) the 
technology of foreign firms.  As may be seen from Table 6, we do not find support for 
this hypothesis in any of our three vertical transfer variables.  Virtually all the 
coefficients are highly significant and for most cases one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the effects are the same for firms that are close to and far from the efficiency frontier.  
In sum, Sutton’s (2007) prediction that the vertical transfer of capability is an 
important phenomenon is strongly supported, and the effect seems to be strong across the 
board irrespective of the relative efficiency of domestic firms.  However, we do not find 
support for an inverted U relationship or for the prediction that firms further from the 
                                                 
32 We have also estimated this equation with markup and markup
2 (results shown in the first panel of 
appendix Table A5) and found that the coefficients on markup
2are not significantly different from zero in 
any category.   26
frontier are discouraged from innovating by competition while firms close to the frontier 
are spurred by competition to innovate.   
 
4.2  Business Environment 
With respect to the business environment, we have carried out two tests.  First, we check 
whether overall differences in levels of development of markets and institutions, captured 
by stratifying the sample by economically and institutionally different regions, result in 
different effects of competition and transfer of capability on innovation.  Second we use a 
firm-level measure of business environment, bribery (corruption), and test whether 
differences in this indicator matter.   
In Table 7, we present the coefficients from separate estimates of equation (1) for 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central Europe and the 
Baltic (CEB) and South Eastern Europe, including Turkey (SEE).  Since markets and 
market oriented institutions are widely viewed as functioning better in the CEB region 
than in the CIS and SEE regions,
33 one may expect that the dispersion of firms in terms of 
efficiency would be smaller and firms in CEB would operate more at a neck-and-neck 
level and closer to the frontier than firms in CIS and SEE.  The Aghion et al. (2005b) 
model would hence predict a stronger positive relationship between competition and 
innovation in the CEB region than in the two other regions. (One could even expect a 
negative relationship between competition and innovation in CIS and SEE countries if 
their firms were to be sufficiently far from the frontier.) 
Our estimates in Table 7 do not support this prediction. Whereas the CEB 
coefficients on markup are positive and significant for the first two types of innovation, 
the corresponding coefficients for the CIS and SEE are also positive and of similar 
magnitude.  We have also tested for an inverted U relationship and find that the 
coefficients on markup
2 are not significant except in the case of the SEE region for new 
technology (Panel B of appendix Table A5).   If anything, the positive coefficient on the 
first derivative and negative coefficient on the second derivative point to a U (not an 
inverted U) relationship between competition and innovation in the SEE.  The estimates 
in Table 7 also indicate that selling to MNEs and importing brings about greater 
                                                 
33 The CEB scores higher than either of the other two regions in all of the transition indicators published 
annually by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in the EBRD Transition Report, from 
2002 to 2007.    27
innovation in all regions,
34 and that exporting induces firms in CIS and SEE, but not in 
CEB, to engage in all three types of innovation. Overall, we detect no evidence that firms 
in a more pro-business environment are more likely to display a positive or inverted U 
relationship between competition and innovation, or that they are more sensitive to 
foreign presence.  
We next present complementary tests of whether a more pro-business 
environment in terms of lower level of bribery (corruption) induces firms to respond to 
competition by investing more in innovation (Aghion et al., 2005b). We argue that an 
environment free of corruption is pro-business because it is transparent, less costly and 
enables new players to enter the market with clear-cut rules.  Hence, the question that we 
examine is whether firms exhibit stronger sensitivity of innovation to competition in less 
corrupt environments.  
To test this hypothesis, we classify firms as being in low, medium and high 
corruption environments on the basis of the distribution of answers to the question: 
“What percentage of annual sales does a firm like yours pay in unofficial payments to 
public officials?” We estimate equation (1) separately for firms in each of the three 
bribery categories and compare the estimated coefficients on markup across these 
categories. We note that the three categories have highly statistically different mean 
values of bribery -- 0.005, 0.011 and 0.021, respectively – but on the whole we do not 
find systematic differences between the estimated coefficients of firms in the low, 
medium and high categories of corruption (Table 8).
35 We also test for the inverted U 
hypothesis in the Panel C of appendix Table A5 and find that there is no support for this 
hypothesis either. Similarly, there are no systematic differences between the significantly 
positive coefficients on “pressure from foreign competition” for the first two types of 
innovation. In acquiring a new technology and obtaining accreditation, firms in low and 
high bribery environments are similarly responsive to vertical transfers of capability 
through sales to MNEs and importing. Firms in the low bribery category have lower 
sensitivity of product innovation to sales to MNEs and greater sensitivity to exporting 
than firms in medium and high bribery environments. 
                                                 
34 Two exceptions are SEE in product innovation and CEB in importing, which generate correctly signed 
but insignificant coefficients. 
35 The only difference is in developing a new product where the coefficient on markup is statistically 
significant for the high and low corruption  categories but insignificant for the medium corruption category 
of firms.   28
4.3  Manufacturing v. Services 
Finally, we note that the effects of globalization may vary across different sectors of the 
economy if, for example, one sector comprises primarily tradables and the other non-
tradables. We therefore test whether the innovation effects of competition and vertical 
linkages with foreign firms are different for firms in manufacturing than for those in 
services. This manufacturing-service sector distinction is also useful because the service 
sector is rapidly gaining in importance in many emerging market economies and existing 
studies of FDI and innovation have almost invariably had access only to data on 
manufacturing and thus failed to analyze services.  The estimates in Table 9 indicate that 
there is not much difference in the innovation effect of competition, vertical transfer of 
capabilities and distance to the frontier between firms in manufacturing and services. The 
coefficients are for the most part similar. Moreover, the estimates of the coefficients on 
markup and markup
2 in the fourth panel of appendix Table A5 show that the relationship 
is not necessarily steeper in one sector or another.  The results hence indicate that the 
effect of globalization, as captured by our three sets of variables, is broad-based and 
relatively similar in firms that produce goods as opposed to services.  
5.  Conclusion 
Motivated by the growing theoretical literature on globalization and innovation, together 
with the limited and contradictory empirical evidence in this area, we use rich firm-level 
data from the 27 emerging market economies of the post-communist countries to test 
predictions about the effects of product market competition and linkages with foreign 
firms on domestic firms’ innovative activities. Our focus on innovation is motivated by 
the fact that (a) innovation is a key channel through which local firms try to stay 
competitive and (b) existing literature focuses primarily on productivity effects, assuming 
(but not showing) that the mechanism underlying these effects is innovation. 
Our main findings are that (i) supplying multinationals as well as exporting and 
importing (vertical relationships) induce innovation by domestic firms, (ii) firms that 
have market power tend to innovate more, but greater pressure from foreign competition 
also stimulates innovation; (iii) there is no evidence for an inverted U relationship 
between innovation and competition in either the more efficient or laggard firms, and (iv) 
the relationship between globalization and innovation does not vary across the 
manufacturing and service sectors or with differences in the business environment.   29
Our first finding supports the view of Sutton (2007a) and others who argue that 
emerging market economies benefit from globalization through the vertical transfer of 
capability from foreign to domestic firms. We find this effect to be substantial for all 
three types of innovation that we study, suggesting that the supply chain of multinational 
enterprises and international trade are an important means for domestic firms to raise 
their capability. The policy implication of this finding is that policy measures that 
facilitate foreign direct investment and international trade enhance domestic welfare 
through greater innovative activities of domestic firms. 
Our second set of findings provides clear-cut evidence in an area that has seen 
conflicting theoretical conjectures and empirical analyses. The Schumpeterian view is 
that market power promotes innovation by providing a stable platform to fund these 
investments and by making it easier for the firm to capture the benefits.  Moreover, 
innovation is spurred in order to maintain existing rents in the face of competitive threat. 
This is in contrast to the view that market power reduces innovation by protecting 
entrepreneurs who fail to innovate. Aghion et al.’s (2004, 2005a, 2005b) theory 
reconciles these opposing views by predicting that the Schumpeterian effect dominates in 
industries with laggard firms, while competition spurs investment among high 
performing firms. Our second set of findings is that (a) firms with market power tend to 
be the innovators in terms of developing new products and acquiring new technologies, 
but less so in obtaining formal accreditations, (b) there is no strong differential effect of 
product market competition on the laggard v. the high performance firms and hence, the 
inverted U relationship generated by the balance of these two, (c) firms further away 
from the frontier (laggard firms) are less likely to innovate, (d) greater pressure from 
foreign competition stimulates innovation, and (e) larger firms are more likely to 
innovate. Combining these results suggests that it is the larger firms with market power 
that innovate, spurred in part by the need to escape foreign competition.  One possible 
reason for these results is that undeveloped financial markets in the emerging market 
economies force firms to rely on their own profits to finance their innovation. If so, our 
findings have policy implications not only for direct stimuli of innovation, but also 
indirect ones via development of financial markets. 
Finally, our third set of findings indicates that (a) the effects of competition, 
vertical linkages with foreign firms and distance to the frontier are broad-based and   30
relatively similar in manufacturing and services and (b) firms in a more pro-business 
environment do not invest more in innovation and are not more likely to display the 
inverted U relationship between competition and innovation. The fact that the effects are 
uniform across sectors is welcome in that relevant policies may not have to be geared 
differentially toward manufacturing and the service sector. The lack of differential effect 
across varying institutional (business environment) settings suggests that researchers and 
policy makers need to invest more in understanding better the effect of environment on 
business behavior 
Taken in their entirety, our results are both encouraging and sobering. Whereas 
the advocates of globalization and market oriented institutions may be disappointed by 
the finding that greater product market competition and better business environment do 
not foster innovation, they will be cheered by the finding that foreign direct investment 
and foreign competition promote innovation among domestic firms and that firms in 
more market oriented economies tend to innovate more.  
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Table 1: Baseline Specification for All Firms 
 
   New Product    New Technology    New Accreditation 
Competition                    
Markup 0.588*** 0.874**  0.636*** 1.091***  -0.018  -0.434 
 (0.109)  (0.344)  (0.111)  (0.357) (0.149)  (0.456) 
Markup
2   -0.489   -0.774    0.706 
   (0.556)  (0.577)  (0.745) 
Pressure from foreign competition             
Low 0.061*  0.061*  0.080**  0.081**  0.053  0.052 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.047)  (0.047) 
Medium & High  0.123*** 0.123*** 0.151*** 0.151***  0.087**  0.087** 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033) (0.041)  (0.041) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability             
Share of sales to MNEs  0.243*** 0.244*** 0.223*** 0.223***  0.413*** 0.413***
 (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.066) (0.074)  (0.073) 
Export share  0.297*** 0.296*** 0.243*** 0.242***  0.464*** 0.465***
 (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.074) (0.081)  (0.081) 
Import share  0.385*** 0.384*** 0.288*** 0.287***  0.210*** 0.211***
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) (0.050)  (0.050) 
Ability             
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.041*  -0.038* -0.040*  -0.037* -0.017  -0.020 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023) (0.028)  (0.028) 
Controls             
lnL, t-3  0.129*** 0.129*** 0.134*** 0.135***  0.271*** 0.270***
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.033) (0.047)  (0.047) 
(lnL)
2, t-3  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 -0.011*  -0.011* 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Share of skilled workers, t-3  0.038  0.038  -0.012 -0.012  -0.095 -0.095 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.062)  (0.062) 
Share of workers with Univ. Ed. t-3  0.232*** 0.232*** 0.185*** 0.185***  0.212*** 0.212***
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.053) (0.069)  (0.069) 
Firm’s age  -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.041**  -0.040**  0.026  0.026 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.020) (0.024)  (0.024) 
State owned dummy  -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.105**  -0.104**  0.016  0.015 
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.047) (0.055)  (0.055) 
Compete in national markets  0.229*** 0.229*** 0.216*** 0.216***  0.256*** 0.257***
   (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034) (0.034)  (0.045) (0.045) 
No. of Observations  11,665  11,665  11,562  11,562  11,643  11,643 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. 
Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Index of Barriers to Entry   -0.010***  -0.953***  0.904**  -0.190** 
 (0.003)  (0.181)  (0.440)  (0.081) 
N observations  8,248  59  62  60 
 
Notes:  
The table reports separate correlations of our “index of barriers to entry” (described in Section 
3.2) with firm profitability, and rates of firm turnover, survival and entry. In all specifications, 
country and industry fixed effects are included but not reported.  
The dependent variable in the probit specification (first column) is equal to one if a firm reported 
no (zero) profits and equal to zero otherwise. Year fixed effects are also included but not reported 
in the probit equation.  
The firm turnover, entry rates and firm survival rate, from Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta 
(2004), are provided for the following five transition countries at the 2-digit NACE industry 
level: Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia. For these specifications, barriers to entry 
are measured as the median response in a given country and industry. Turnover, survival and 
entry rates are in percent. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Instrumented vs Non-Instrumented Estimates on Markup 
 
   New Product  New Technology  New  Accreditation 
Baseline estimates 
  Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit  Linear 
Markup  0.588*** 0.202*** 0.636*** 0.209*** -0.018  -0.009 
  (0.109) (0.037) (0.111) (0.036) (0.149)  (0  .025)
      
Instrumental Variables (IV) 
  Probit Linear Probit Linear Probit  Linear 
            
Own response             
Markup 7.716***  2.504*** 10.898*** 3.782*** 2.037 0.056 
 (2.236)  (0.714)  (1.716)  (0.591) (2.708) (0.457) 
         









No. of Obs.  11,606    11,503    11,584   
            
Other firms’ 
response 
          
Markup 4.185* 2.527* 7.827* 2.764* 1.335 0.058 
 (2.462)  (1.543)  (4.195)  (1.458) (5.564) (0.937) 
         









No. of Obs.  10,714    10,616    10,696   
      
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). IV probit is implemented as in Newey (1987). 
Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Linear means 
standard linear least-squares or instrumental-variables estimator. In the specification that uses 
other firms’ responses about barriers to entry, we consider industries with at least five firms in a 
given year, industry and country, which helps to reduce the noise in other firms’ answers.   
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. The asterisks at the 1
st stage F-statistic show the significance of the 
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic for the null hypothesis that instruments are weak.  
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Table 4: Baseline Specification for All Firms using Solow distance 
 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
Competition        
Markup 0.562*** 1.369*** 0.255  0.898*  -0.283  -0.118 
 (0.171)  (0.526)  (0.168)  (0.539) (0.214)  (0.675) 
Markup
2   -1.250   -1.107   -0.199 
   (0.848)   (0.882)   (1.164) 
Pressure from foreign competition             
Low  0.057 0.062 0.093*  0.094*  0.095 0.097 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068) (0.068) 
Medium&High 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.171*** 0.171***  0.109*  0.108* 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.061) (0.061) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability             
Share of sales to MNEs  0.418*** 0.418*** 0.276*** 0.274***  0.357*** 0.357***
  (0.107) (0.108) (0.097) (0.097) (0.108) (0.108) 
Export  share  0.270** 0.256** 0.186*  0.183*  0.345*** 0.338***
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.104) (0.104) (0.114) (0.115) 
Import share  0.421*** 0.425*** 0.260*** 0.260***  0.120*  0.125* 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.072) (0.072) 
Ability             
Distance (Solow)  -0.033**  -0.035**  -0.019 -0.020 -0.041**  -0.046***
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Controls             
lnL,  3yrs  ago  0.143*** 0.146*** 0.126** 0.127** 0.274*** 0.276***
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.068) (0.068) 
(lnL)
2, 3yrs ago  -0.009  -0.009  -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Share of skilled workers, 3yrs ago  0.046  0.048  0.028  0.028  -0.098  -0.089 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.073) (0.092) (0.092) 
Share of workers with higher education, 3yrs ago  0.179**  0.175**  0.099  0.099  0.141  0.148 
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.107) (0.107) 
Firm’s  age  -0.030 -0.027 -0.039 -0.038  0.046  0.049 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) 
State owned  -0.334*** -0.326*** -0.163** -0.162** -0.106  -0.097 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.084) (0.084) 
Compete in national markets  0.269*** 0.274*** 0.233*** 0.233***  0.255*** 0.256***
    (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.068) (0.068) 
No.  of    Observations  5,020 5,020 4,985 4,985 5,011 5,011 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1) where location, time, country and industry fixed effects 
are included but not reported. Definitions of the variables are in appendix Table A1. The Solow residual is 
calculated using equation (2). Solow residual distance is the log difference between the average of the top 
third within a given country/industry/year cell foreign firms’ Solow residual and that of a domestic firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Testing for Endogeneity due to the Timing of the Variables 




2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 






2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 






2002 & 2005 
Panel 
(current) 




  (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
C o m p e t i t i o n               
Markup  0.593***  0.557**  0.497*  0.310 0.460*** -0.050  -0.524 0.654*  -0.006 0.031 0.011  -0.170 
  (0.098) (0.237) (0.300) (0.367) (0.100) (0.243) (0.328) (0.375) (0.105) (0.250) (0.346) (0.394) 
                                   
Pressure from foreign competition                        
    Low  0.159*** 0.297*** 0.331*** 0.250**  0.154*** 0.186**  0.395*** 0.342*** 0.153*** 0.244*** 0.227*  0.097 
  (0.032) (0.078) (0.112) (0.101) (0.033) (0.079) (0.112)  (0.109)  (0.035) (0.082) (0.117) (0.116) 
    Medium&High  0.276***  0.123*  0.084 0.263  **  0.261*** 0.176**  0.351*** 0.168*  0.286*** 0.189*** 0.158 0.065 
   (0.027) (0.069) (0.098) (0.087) (0.028) (0.070) (0.102)  (0.097)  (0.030) (0.072) (0.106) (0.097) 
                
V e r t i c a l   T r a n s f e r               
Sales  to  MNEs  0.308***  0.356***  0.191  0.305*** 0.213*** 0.158** 0.065  0.264** 0.344*** 0.374*** 0.294** 0.366*** 
  (0.033) (0.083) (0.120) (0.108) (0.032) (0.079) (0.119) (0.108) (0.033) (0.079) (0.122) (0.109) 
Export share  0.296***  0.463***  0.444*** 0.371*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.315*** 0.189*  0.423*** 0.494*** 0.466*** 0.442*** 
  (0.032) (0.084) (0.115) (0.116) (0.031) (0.076) (0.109) (0.110) (0.033) (0.079) (0.112) (0.114) 
Import share  0.368***  0.338***  0.319*** 0.182**  0.307*** 0.255*** 0.283*** 0.146  0.212*** 0.190*** 0.298*** 0.125 
  (0.025) (0.061) (0.088) (0.086) (0.026) (0.064) (0.092) (0.091) (0.028) (0.067) (0.098) (0.094) 
Distance                                     
Distance -0.075**  -0.129**  -0.121*  -0.117  -0.076*** -0.044 -0.051 -0.054 -0.095*** -0.046 -0.036 -0.026 
(Mahalanobis) (0.020)  (0.053)  (0.072)  (0.075) (0.021) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.025) (0.066) (0.096) (0.096) 
                                     
Distance  -0.039***  -0.092***  -0.064* -0.072* -0.035*** -0.069**  -0.062* -0.067* -0.060*** -0.026 -0.002 -0.005 
(Solow)  (0.012) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) (0.012) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038) (0.014) (0.030) (0.043) (0.044) 
  
Notes: Markup and Pressure from Foreign Competition each enter the regressions separately. Vertical Transfer of Capability (sales to MNEs, Export, Import), 
Mahalanobis Distance and Solow Residual Distance enter the regressions separately. Sales to MNEs, Export share, and Import share are set as dummy variables equal 
to one for positive values. Full Sample is with current RHS values; 2002&2005 Panel  is with current RHS values; 2005 Panel is with both current and lagged RHS 
values. The coefficients in columns (a) differ from the corresponding entries in Table 1 because other controls in Table 5 are excluded. Location type, time, country and 
industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6: Testing for the Interaction between Distance and Competition. 
 
   New Good  New Technology  New Accreditation 
   Distance to the Frontier  Distance to the Frontier  Distance to the Frontier 
   Close  Middle  Far  Close  Middle  Far  Close  Middle  Far 
Competition               
Markup 0.359  0.334*  0.957*** 0.998*** 0.319  0.725*** -0.142  -0.254  0.229 
   (0.230)  (0.189)  (0.171)  (0.236)  (0.198) (0.167) (0.307) (0.264) (0.229) 
Pressure from foreign competition                     
Low 0.139**  -0.046  0.089  0.039  0.123*  0.080  -0.032  0.112  0.106 
   (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.065) (0.064) (0.080) (0.086) (0.084) 
Medium & High  0.170*** 0.049  0.147**  0.142**  0.167*** 0.145**  0.084  -0.012  0.174** 
   (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.057) (0.058) (0.069) (0.075) (0.074) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                     
Share of sales to MNEs  0.186  0.312**  0.221*  0.278**  0.203*  0.178*  0.383*** 0.573*** 0.310** 
   (0.117)  (0.124)  (0.113)  (0.118)  (0.121) (0.107) (0.126) (0.139) (0.121) 
Export share  0.301**  0.163  0.363*** 0.293**  0.105  0.318**  0.372*** 0.485*** 0.596***
   (0.138)  (0.141)  (0.137)  (0.128)  (0.133) (0.127) (0.140) (0.147) (0.145) 
Import share  0.432*** 0.280*** 0.438*** 0.242*** 0.328*** 0.295*** 0.234*** 0.182*  0.213** 
   (0.069)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.070) (0.065) (0.087) (0.093) (0.088) 
No. of observations  3,945  3,890  3,830  3,904  3,859  3,799  3,933  3,882  3,820 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Close denotes the lowest third of firms in terms of 
distance to foreign firms; Far denotes the greatest third of firms in terms of distance to foreign firms. Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are 
included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Testing for Business Environment: Regional Differences 
 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
   CIS  CEB  SEE  CIS  CEB SEE  CIS CEB SEE 
Competition               
Markup 0.673*** 0.519**  0.559*** 0.770***  0.728*** 0.442**  0.239  -0.371  -0.041 
  (0.170) (0.210) (0.201) (0.168) (0.228) (0.198) (0.226) (0.311) (0.270) 
Pressure from foreign competition                 
Low  0.112**  0.162**  -0.131*  0.057 0.239*** 0.004 0.024 0.051 0.065 
  (0.053) (0.067) (0.067) (0.054) (0.075) (0.070) (0.073) (0.094) (0.089) 
Medium & High  0.149*** 0.261*** -0.035  0.138***  0.237*** 0.141**  0.089  0.094  0.039 
  (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.052) (0.067) (0.057) (0.068) (0.084) (0.073) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                 
Share of sales to MNEs  0.320*** 0.236*  0.137  0.204*  0.367*** 0.181*  0.341*** 0.677*** 0.289** 
  (0.116) (0.132) (0.107) (0.112) (0.132) (0.105) (0.130) (0.139) (0.126) 
Export  share  0.371**  0.106 0.481*** 0.400***  0.047 0.302**  0.611*** 0.166 0.597*** 
  (0.148) (0.145) (0.132) (0.127) (0.145) (0.123) (0.142) (0.171) (0.136) 
Import share  0.441*** 0.370*** 0.314*** 0.352***  0.182**  0.263*** 0.191**  0.125  0.342*** 
  (0.059) (0.073) (0.071) (0.058) (0.080) (0.071) (0.077) (0.104) (0.090) 
Ability                 
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.002  -0.160*** -0.040 -0.052 -0.043 -0.064  0.078*  -0.057 -0.091* 
  (0.033) (0.045) (0.043) (0.034) (0.048) (0.042) (0.045) (0.058) (0.052) 
                             
Observations  5,010 3,154 3,500 4,964 3,133 3,464 5,006 3,146 3,490 
  
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. CIS stands for Commonwealth Independent States; CEB 
stands for Central Europe and Baltic; SEE stands for South East Europe. Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included but not reported.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   41
Table 8: Testing for Business Environment: Bribery 
 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
 Bribery  Bribery Bribery 
    Low Medium High  Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
Competition               
Markup 0.516*** 0.281  0.891*** 0.835*** 0.469**  0.568*** -0.085  -0.013  -0.052 
  (0.198) (0.189) (0.190) (0.203) (0.195) (0.188) (0.269) (0.264) (0.254) 
Pressure from foreign competition                     
Low  0.004 0.082 0.068 0.150**  0.008 0.102*  0.067 0.076 0.044 
  (0.063) (0.061) (0.060) (0.067) (0.066) (0.061) (0.087) (0.083) (0.082) 
Medium & High  0.097*  0.153*** 0.097*  0.224*** 0.095*  0.151*** 0.162**  0.037  0.095 
  (0.056) (0.054) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability                 
Share of sales to MNEs  0.088  0.382*** 0.310*** 0.294*** 0.174  0.217*  0.637*** 0.168  0.360** 
  (0.103) (0.133) (0.120) (0.102) (0.127) (0.118) (0.113) (0.142) (0.141) 
Export  share  0.459*** 0.028 0.241 0.207*  0.267*  0.192 0.328**  0.539*** 0.549*** 
  (0.127) (0.144) (0.152) (0.117) (0.141) (0.136) (0.128) (0.158) (0.155) 
Import share  0.331*** 0.432*** 0.393*** 0.206*** 0.335*** 0.360*** 0.257*** 0.118  0.313*** 
  (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.087) (0.092) (0.090) 
Ability                 
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.106*** -0.043  0.002 -0.035 -0.054 -0.021 -0.072 -0.061  0.087* 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) 
Observations  3,753 3,974 3,930 3,722 3,938 3,900 3,739 3,966 3924 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included 
but not reported. Low denotes the lowest third quantity in terms of bribery made. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.   42
Table 9: Testing for Response in Manufacturing v. Services 
 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
    MNFR SERV MNFR SERV MNFR SERV 
Competition                 
Markup 0.579*** 0.598*** 0.649*** 0.593***  0.079  0.083 
 (0.202)  (0.153)  (0.186)  (0.168) (0.230) (0.242) 
Pressure from foreign competition        
Low  0.096 0.034 0.008 0.131**  -0.068 0.093 
 (0.064)  (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.056) (0.079) (0.076) 
Medium & High  0.143*** 0.145*** 0.095*  0.183***  0.039  0.098 
 (0.055)  (0.045)  (0.052)  (0.051) (0.065) (0.067) 
Vertical Transfer of Capability        
Share of sales to MNEs  0.235**  0.196*  0.270*** 0.237**  0.429*** 0.486***
 (0.114)  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.105) (0.110) (0.128) 
Export share  0.273**  0.258**  0.277*** 0.224*  0.379*** 0.732***
 (0.119)  (0.122)  (0.103)  (0.125) (0.112) (0.141) 
Import share  0.458*** 0.302*** 0.254*** 0.274***  0.271*** 0.104 
 (0.071)  (0.053)  (0.064)  (0.058) (0.078) (0.080) 
Ability        
Distance (Mahalanobis)  -0.087**  -0.037 -0.052 -0.041 -0.037 -0.059 
 (0.038)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.037) (0.042) (0.051) 
No. of Observations  3,892  5,624  3,855  5,580  3,884  5,615 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. 
MNFR is Manufacturing, SERV is services. Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included 
but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table A1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Name  Variable Definition  BEEPS question 
Newproduct  New product or upgrade 
existing product 
Dummy variable. Has your company undertaken any of the following initiatives over 
the last 36 months? Dummy variable is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any of the two 
questions: 
- Developed successfully a major new product line 
- Upgraded an existing product line 
Newtech  New technology is 
implemented 
Dummy variable = 1 if answer is affirmative to question: Has your firm acquired new 
production technology over the last 36 months? 
Newaccred  New accreditation  
is received 
Dummy variable  = 1 if answer is affirmative to question: 
Has your company Obtained a new quality accreditation (ISO 9000, 9002 or 14,000, 
AGCCP, etc) over the last 36 months? Dummy variable is equal to one if ‘yes’ to any 
of the two questions  
Markup  Markup  Considering your main product line or main line of services in the domestic market, 
by what margin does your sales price exceed your operating costs (i.e., the cost of 
material inputs plus wage costs but not overhead and depreciation)? 
ForComp  Pressure from foreign 
competition 
How would you rate the importance of pressure from foreign competition on key 
decisions about your business with respect to “Reducing the production costs of 
existing products or services”: 
           None  Not important 
           Low  Slightly important 
           Medium  Fairly important 
           High  Very important 
SMNE  Share of sales to MNEs  Share of sales to multinationals located in your country (not including your parent 
company, if applicable) 
EXPORT  Export share  Share of sales exported directly or indirectly through a distributor 
IMPORT  Import share  Share of your firm’s material inputs and supplies that are imported directly or 
indirectly through a distributor 
L Labor  Number of permanent and temporary employees 36 month ago 
CU  Capacity utilization  Level of utilization of facilities/man power relative to the maximum output possible 
using its facilities/man power at the time 
K  Capital  The estimate of the replacement value of the physical  production assets used by your 
firm (land, building, equipment)   
M  Materials  The estimate of the material input costs  and bought in components/services 
corresponding to your firm’s total sales 
SKILL  Share of skilled workers, 3 
yrs ago 
What share of your current permanent, full-time workers are skilled workers 36 
months ago? 
EDU  Share of workers with higher 
education, 3yrs ago 
What share of the workforce at your firm has some university education in 36 months 
ago? 
Age  Log (Firm’s age )  Year of survey minus the year when the firm was established. For the year 
established: In what year did your firm begin operations in this country? 
SOE  State owned  Government is the major shareholder (50%+) 
CNM  Compete in national markets  Does your firm compete in the national market (i.e. whole country) for its main 
product line or service or does it serve primarily the local market (i.e. region, city, or 
neighborhood)? 1= yes. 
LOC  Location  Type of location: Capital; Other city over 1 million; Other 250,000-1,000,000; Other  
50,000-250,000; Under 50,000 
BR  Bribes  On average, what percent of total annual sales do firm’s like yours typically pay in 
unofficial payments/gifts to public officials? 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics. 
   Mean    St.Dev. 
Innovation Variables       
New Product  0.562    0.496 
New Technology  0.302    0.459 
New Accreditation   0.129    0.335 
Competition       
Markup  0.209    0.118 
Pressure from foreign competition       
Low  0.173    0.378 
Medium &High  0.297    0.457 
Vertical Transfer of Capability       
Share of sales to MNEs  0.066    0.196 
Export share  0.069    0.187 
Import share  0.258    0.359 
Ability       
Distance (Mahalanobis)  3.034    0.706 
Distance(Solow)  0.364    0.377 
Controls       
lnL, 3yrs ago  3.000    1.604 
(lnL)
2, 3yrs ago  11.577    11.530 
Share of skilled workers, 3yrs ago  0.487    0.309 
Share of workers with higher education, 3yr ago  0.272    0.290 
Firm’s age  2.367    0.777 
State owned  0.118    0.322 
Compete in national markets  0.667    0.471 
Location       
Capital  0.313    0.464 
Other, over 1 million  0.060    0.237 
Other, 250,000-1,000,000  0.157    0.364 
Other, 50,000-250,000  0.224    0.417 
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Table A3: Baseline Specification for All Firms. Marginal effects evaluated at means.  
   New Product    New Technology    New Accreditation 
Competition                    
Markup 0.231***   0.215***   -0.003   
  (0.043)   (0.038)   (0.023)  
Pressure from foreign competition             
Low 0.024*    0.028**    0.008   
  (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.008)  
Medium & High  0.048***   0.052***   0.014**   
  (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.007)  
Vertical Transfer of Capability             
Share of sales to MNEs  0.096***   0.075***   0.063***   
  (0.026)   (0.022)   (0.011)  
Export share  0.116***   0.082***   0.071***   
  (0.031)   (0.025)   (0.013)  
Import share  0.151***   0.098***   0.032***   
  (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.008)  
Ability             
Distance  (Mahalanobis)  -0.016*   -0.014*   -0.003   
  (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.004)  
Controls             
lnL, t-3  0.051***   0.045***   0.041***   
  (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.007)  
(lnL)
2,  t-3  -0.002   -0.002   -0.002*   
  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Share of skilled workers, t-3  0.015    -0.004    -0.014   
  (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.009)  
Share of workers with Univ. Ed. t-3  0.091***   0.063***   0.032***   
  (0.020)   (0.018)   (0.011)  
Firm’s age  -0.021***   -0.014**    0.004   
  (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.004)  
State owned dummy  -0.091***   -0.035**    0.002   
  (0.018)   (0.015)   (0.009)  
Compete in national markets  0.090***   0.071***   0.037***   
    (0.013)   (0.011)   (0.006)  
No.  of  Observations  11,665     11,562     11,643  
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Location, time, 
country and industry fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number 
of observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A4: Baseline Specification for All Firms 
   New   New  New  
   Product Technology  Accreditation 
Export share, t-3  0.311***  0.257***  0.450*** 
  (0.118) (0.107) (0.135) 
No. of Observations  5,374  6,151  6,107 
 
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1) where export share is constructed using retrospective 
questions about growth rate of sales revenue and exports as well as the current year information on the 
share of exports in total sales and the level of total sales. Other variables as defined are in the 
specification reported in Table 1 are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in 
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Table A5: Testing for inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition. 
   New Product  New Technology  New Accreditation 
      
Panel A:     Distance to the Frontier   
   Close  Middle  Far  Close  Middle  Far  Close  Middle  Far 
Markup  1.211  1.248**  0.902  1.687**  0.492  1.244**  -0.516 -0.534 -0.207 
   (0.740)  (0.604)  (0.562)  (0.799)  (0.642) (0.563)  (0.984) (0.835) (0.729) 
Markup
2  -1.678  -1.585 0.086  -1.352 -0.301  -0.811  0.734 0.485 0.674 
   (1.382)  (0.997)  (0.845)  (1.507)  (1.064) (0.837)  (1.901) (1.404) (1.087) 
             
Panel B:      Regional  development     
 CIS  CEB  SEE  CIS  CEB SEE  CIS CEB SEE 
Markup  1.175**  0.770 0.709  1.037* 1.097  1.967*** 0.048 -0.514 -0.536 
   (0.541)  (0.645)  (0.641)  (0.554)  (0.704) (0.648)  (0.745) (0.900) (0.830) 
Markup
2 -0.853  -0.434  -0.255  -0.452 -0.635  -2.565** 0.317 0.256 0.829 
 (0.875)  (1.053)  (1.027)  (0.895) (1.165) (1.033)  (1.196) (1.591) (1.380) 
             
Panel C:        Bribery       
 Low  Medium  High  Low Medium High  Low Medium  High 
Markup 1.505**  0.656  0.352  2.665*** 0.709  0.117  -0.216  -1.276  0.039 
   (0.647)  (0.602)  (0.594)  (0.666)  (0.632) (0.595)  (0.818) (0.807) (0.790) 
Markup
2 -1.556  -0.637 0.917  -3.126*** -0.406 0.761  0.226 2.127  -0.154 
 (1.081)  (0.983)  (0.957)  (1.081) (1.028) (0.949)  (1.397) (1.300) (1.259) 
          
Panel D:     Sectors     
 MNFR  SERV  MNFR  SERV  MNFR  SERV 
Markup 1.485**  0.633  1.575***  0.651  0.753  -0.824 
   (0.646)  (0.481)  (0.624) (0.536) (0.750)  (0.726) 
Markup
2 -1.561  -0.059  -1.540  -0.097  -1.166  1.492 
 (1.047)  (0.766)  (1.032)  (0.846) (1.227)  (1.141) 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (1). Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A1. Close 
denotes the lowest third of firms in terms of distance to foreign firms; Far denotes the greatest third of firms in 
terms of distance to foreign firms. MNFR is Manufacturing, SERV is services.  CIS stands for Commonwealth 
Independent States; CEB stands for Central Europe and Baltic; SEE stands for South East Europe. Low denotes the 
lowest third quantity in terms of bribery made. Location, time, country and industry fixed effects are included but 
not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 